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Abstract
The paper uses Malawian data from the Third Integrated Household Survey to
investigate the presence and pattern of contextual e¤ects of community level educa-
tion on household poverty. These contextual e¤ects reect the presence of education
externalities at the community level. I use an adaptation of the Hausman-Taylor
estimator for hierchical models which controls for level-2 endogeneity of community
schooling. The results show that regardless of gender, there is a signicant positive
e¤ect of community level education on household welfare in rural and urban areas
which is over and above that arising from education within the household. These
externalities of community level education are larger for females than males. The
paper nds that the return to within household education is smaller in magnitude
than the community level externality of education. These ndings are robust to
alternative denitions of schooling and level of aggregation. The paper also nds
that in both rural and urban areas, least educated households enjoy signicantly
larger benets from increases in female and male years of schooling at the commu-
nity level than the most educated households. This means that community level
schooling not only spillovers to the rest of the community membership in terms of
improved living standards, but also the positive education spillovers on household
welfare are equality-inducing.
Keywords: Contextual e¤ects; externalities; Malawi
1 Introduction
Groups of households such as communities or villages become di¤erentiated, and that
households in a group are usually interdependent which entails that what inuences one
group member may also inuence other group members, either through direct interactions
with other group members or by creating a group environment that inuences individual
members (Hox, 2010; Goldstein, 2011; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012; Dunn et al.
2014). Households in the same group may for instance be exposed to the same local
policies and programmes or they may be subject to the same traditional norms regarding
the roles of men and women (McCulloch et al., 2008; Goldstein, 2011). A households
Department of Economics, Chancellor College, University of Malawi, Box 280, Zomba, Malawi,
rimussa@yahoo.co.uk.
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poverty level may therefore be a result of an interplay of factors within the household
and contextual factors i.e. factors outside the household.
Outside of poverty research, the idea that groups may have collective properties which
inuence their members independently of individual factors has attracted alot of research
interest with a number of studies examining the role of contextual factors on health out-
comes (e.g. Cohen et al. 2006; Mair et al. 2008; Dunn et al. 2014), student performance
(e.g. Marsh et al., 2009; Morin et al., 2014), crime (e.g. Oberwittler, 2004; Winslow and
Shaw, 2006), and agriculture productivity (e.g. Weir and Knight, 2007; Asadullah and
Rahman, 2009; Mussa, 2015). There is however a dearth of poverty studies that have
examined the role of contextual e¤ects of education on household living standards.
These contextual e¤ects may reect the presence of externalities, for instance, the
extent of schooling at the community level can have a positive externality e¤ect on poverty
thus leading to better economic outcomes. Such educational externalities might arise
for instance as uneducated farmers learn from the superior production choices of other
educated farmers in the community (Weir and Knight, 2007). The education externality
could also arise when educated farmers are early innovators and are copied by those with
less schooling (Knight et al., 2003). External benets of education may also arise in a
community through one person taking decisions on behalf of another person (Dreze and
Saran, 1995).
The literature on the determinants of poverty (e.g. Mukherjee and Benson, 2003;
Datt and Jollife, 2005; Zhang and Wan, 2006; Cruces and Wodon, 2007; Gunther and
Harttgen, 2009; Echevin, 2012) has primarily tended to focus on how household level
education a¤ects poverty. A common nding in these studies is that the level of education
within households lowers the likelihood of household poverty and vulnerability to poverty.
What is ignored here is that two households with identical characteristics but living in
communities/contexts with di¤erent average schooling may have di¤erent welfare proles.
The nature of these contextual e¤ects of education may be useful to quantify. The
existence of education externalities has signicant implications on how to evaluate the
costs and benets of investments in education as a failure to account for education ex-
ternalities may lead to its under-provision. This paper looks at the relationship between
poverty and education within and between households in Malawi. The objectives of this
paper are twofold. First, I investigate the existence of community level education exter-
nalities on poverty in Malawi. In this regard, three questions are explored: Are there
community level externalities of education? Do the externalities vary with gender? Are
the externalities larger or smaller in size than the internal returns to education?
The second objective of this paper relates to an understanding of who benets more
from education externalities. Do households with little or no education benet more from
living in communities where some inhabitants are educated? Uneducated households
that reside in communities where some members are educated-the so-called proximate
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illiterates (Basu and Foster, 1998)- are a priori expected to be better o¤ in terms of
welfare than their counterparts who stay in communities where nobody is educated-the
so-called isolated illiterates (Basu and Foster, 1998).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 looks at trends in poverty,
inequality, and economic growth in Malawi. Section 3 presents the methodology and a
description of the data and variables used. This is followed by the empirical results in
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Growth, Poverty, and Education in Malawi
The Malawian government has pursued poverty reduction e¤orts through various strate-
gies emphasizing economic growth, infrastructure development, and the provision of basic
social services. These strategies include the Poverty Alleviation Program (1994); the
Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy (2002-2005); and, more recently, the Malawi Growth
and Development Strategy (MGDS) (2006-2011 and 2011-2016). Although Malawi has
experienced a strong economic growth performance in the recent past, the impact of this
growth on poverty has been mixed.
Table 1 provides selected economic indicators for Malawi over the period 2004 and
2014. The economy grew at an average annual rate of 6.2% between 2004 and 2007, and
marginally decelerated to an average growth of 6.1% between 2008 and 2014. Over the
same period, the agriculture sector was by far Malawis most important contributor to
economic growth, with a contribution averaging 34.0% to overall GDP growth . Given that
economic growth was primarily driven by growth in the agriculture sector, and considering
that about 90% of Malawians live in farm households (Benin et al. 2012), one would expect
that this impressive growth would lead to signicant reductions in poverty.
O¢ cial poverty statistics however indicate that the high economic growth rates could
only translate into marginal poverty reduction. The poverty gures in Table 1 show
that the percentage of poor people in Malawi was 52.4% in 2004, and slightly declined
to 50.7% in 2011 . Interestingly, the high economic growth rate had contrasting e¤ects
on rural and urban poverty. For the period 2004-2011, the poverty headcount in rural
areas minimally increased from 55.9% to 56.6% while urban poverty declined from 25.4%
to 17.3%. Ironically, this dismal poverty reduction performance coincided with the Farm
Input Subsidy Program (FISP), which every year provides low-cost fertilizer and improved
maize seeds to poor smallholders who are mostly rural based (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013).
Implementation of the FISP started in the 2005/6 cropping season, and in the 2012/13
nancial year, the programme represented 4.6% of GDP or 11.5% of the total national
budget (World Bank, 2013).
The formal education system in Malawi comprises of three levels namely; primary,
secondary, and post secondary. Education at all three levels is not compulsory. The
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Malawi government cognizant of the crucial role that human capital accumulation and
development plays in fostering economic growth among other benets introduced free
primary education (FPE) in 1994. With FPE parents no longer have to pay fees for the
primary education of children who attend government schools. Private primary schools
however continue to charge fees. Increasing access to primary and secondary education is
one of the main priority areas identied in the MGDS.
Table 2 presents levels and trends in: a) adult literacy rates, b) primary enrolment
rates, c) primary school dropout rates, and d) average years of schooling between 2004
and 2011. The proportion of the population aged 15 years and over that is able to read and
write increased marginally from 64% in 2004 to 65% in 2011; suggesting limited progress
in improving adult literacy in Malawi. The proportion of adults who are literate is higher
in urban areas than in rural areas. Furthermore, the literacy rate for rural areas has
remained almost unchanged while it has increased by about 3 percentage points between
2004 and 2011.
For both years, progress has been made in increasing primary net enrolment rates.
However, primary enrolment levels in rural areas are lower than those for urban areas. The
internal e¢ ciency of primary school system as measured by the dropout rate seems to have
improved over the ve year period. Average schooling also registered some improvements;
from 4.1 years to 5.0 years in 2004 and 2011 respectively. These improvements in years of
schooling are more pronounced in rural areas where it increased by 20.4% as compared to
5.5% for urban areas. Although the levels are still low, these statistics suggest that Malawi
has registered some progress with respect to primary enrolment, years of schooling, and
internal e¢ ciency.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Modeling Contextual E¤ects of Education
Data for analysing poverty is almost always hierarchically structured in the sense that
households are nested in communities, and the communities in turn are nested in districts.
Hierarchical linear models (HLMs) or linear multilevel models are useful for analyzing
this type of data (McCulloch et al., 2008; Hox, 2010; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012;
Cameron and Miller, 2015). Households in the same cluster/community are likely to be
dependent because they are exposed to a wide range of common observed and unobserved
community factors such as the same traditional norms regarding the roles of men and
women. This dependency means that standard errors from a standard linear regression
model are downward biased, and inferences about the e¤ects of the covariates may lead
to many spurious signicant results (Hox, 2010; Cameron and Miller, 2015). Beyond this,
a key attraction of HLMs is that they are useful for modeling contextual e¤ects ( Arpino
4
and Varriale, 2010; Castellano et al. 2014).
Consider the following two level linear random-intercept model for household i (i =
1::::nj) in community j (j = 1::::Jl)
Level 1 : ln yij = 0j + 
0
1xij + 
0qij + "ij (1)
Level 2 : 0j = 0 + 
0zj + uj (2)
where; in the level 1 model, ln yij is the log of per capita annualized household con-
sumption expenditure, 0j is a community-specic intercept, xij is a vector of observed
household level (level 1) education variables, 1 is its associated coe¢ cient vector, qij is a
vector of other observed household level (level 1) characteristics, zj a vector of community
level variables which capture availability in a community of social and economic services
such as paved roads, clinics, banks,  and  are coe¢ cient vectors of the level-1 and level-2
controls, and "ij  N (0; 2") is a household-specic idiosycratic error term. In the level 2
model, 0 is the overall intercept, and uj  N (0; 2u) are community-level spatial e¤ects
(random intercepts). uj and "ij are assumed to be independent. I measure education
by using average years of schooling in a household, and this is gender-disaggregated to
measure the possibility that education can have a gender-di¤erentiated e¤ect on poverty.
As a sensitivity check, maximum years of schooling is also used. The assumptions about
uj and "ij imply that  ij  N
 
0; 2

where  ij = uj + "ij and 
2
 = 
2
u + 
2
":
The two levels can compactly be re-specied by substituting equation (2) into (1) to
get
ln yij = 0 + 
0
1xij + 
0qij + 
0zj + uj + "ij (3)
Equation (3) implicitly assumes that the e¤ect on poverty of education is the same between
communities and within communities. As shown by both Neuhaus and Kalbeisch (1998)
and Arpino and Varriale (2010), micro (household) and macro (community) level e¤ects
of a variable can be di¤erent, and ignoring these di¤erences can give misleading results.
Community level mean education can e¤ect household poverty even after controlling for
the householdss own education level i.e. there are possible community level contextual
e¤ects of education.
To accommodate these contextual e¤ects, I decompose xij into between xj = 1nj
Pnj
i=1 xij
and within (xij   xj) community components such that xij = xj+(xij   xj). I then extend
equation (3) by allowing di¤erent e¤ects of the two components on poverty, i.e. replacing
01xij in (3) by 
0
w (xij   xj) + 0bxj. to get the following model which simultaneously
accommodates both between and within-community e¤ects
ln yij = 0 + 
0
w (xij   xj) + 0bxj + 0qij + 0zj + uj + "ij (4)
= 0 + 
0
wxij + 
0xj + 0qij + 
0zj + uj + "ij
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where w represents the within-community e¤ect, and b represents the between-community
e¤ect of education. The di¤erence,  = b   w, represents the contextual e¤ect i.e. the
additional e¤ect of education at the community level that is not accounted for at the
household level. The contextual e¤ect essentially represents community level externalities
of education. A test of the hypothesis that  = 0; amounts to testing that there are no ex-
ternality e¤ects of schooling at the community level on poverty. The sign and magnitude
of  respectively indicate the direction and size of the externality e¤ect. A positive (nega-
tive) externality e¤ect of community level schooling on poverty holds if  > 0 ( < 0) : In
order to check the robustness of the results to how community level schooling is measured,
I also use gender-disaggregated maximum years of schooling in a community.
When there are no education externalities, b = w; and equation (4) reduces to
equation (3). Both zj and xj are community level variables, a key di¤erence is that for
zj information is only available at the community while for xj information is available at
the household level as well. I exclude each households value of x when generating the
community level means of education xj.
3.2 Contextual E¤ects and Endogeneity
A possible concern with the contextual e¤ect  is that it can potentially be endogenous.
For instance, education at the community level may be correlated with unobserved de-
terminants of local development, and this selection on unobservables may lead to biased
results. This concern is however assuaged by the fact that the model controls for un-
observed community level random e¤ects through uj: These random e¤ects for example
capture di¤erences in exposure to social policy programmes between communities. More-
over, the paper also controls for community level access to and availability of health and
economic infrastructure through zj:
This notwithstanding, there are other sources of endogeneity to worry about. In
hierchical models there are two types of endogeneity depending on the correlation between
the random error components and the covariates: level-1 endogeneity where cov(xij; "ij) 6=
0; cov(xj; "ij) 6= 0; cov(qij; "ij) 6= 0; and cov(zj; "ij) 6= 0; and level-2 endogeneity which
holds when cov(xij; uj) 6= 0; cov(xj; uj) 6= 0; cov(qij; uj) 6= 0; and cov(zj; uj) 6= 0 (Ebbes et
al., 2004; Castellano et al. 2014). Regression coe¢ cients can be biased and inconsistent in
the presence of these two types of dependencies. In keeping with previous poverty studies
(e.g. Mukherjee and Benson, 2003; Datt and Jollife, 2005, Cruces and Wodon, 2007),
the choice of covariates is driven by an exogeneity criteria i.e. only those covariates that
are determined outside of the current economic system of the household but inuence the
current level of household welfare are included. Using the exogeneity criteria ensures that
the covariates are level-1 exogenous, this however leaves the problem of level-2 endogeneity
unresolved.
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The inclusion of the community level mean education resolves the problem of level-2
endogeneity arising from omitted variables, but it creates another form of level-2 endo-
geneity emanating from measurement error. The use of community level sample mean
values of education instead of the population community mean entails a measurement
error that can lead to attenuated contextual coe¢ cients (Grilli and Rampichini, 2006).
An adaptation of the Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator from panel data econometrics
can be used to overcome this problem in hierchical models (Ebbes et al., 2004; Castellano
et al. 2014).
A key attraction of the Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator is that it addresses the
problem of level-2 endogeneity without requiring any additional exogeneity assumptions
or external instrumental variables (Castellano et al. 2014). The HT estimator generates
instruments from the available data (internal instruments) instead (Ebbes et al., 2004). I
use the adapted HT estimator to address the measurement error problem in community
level mean education. Consider Xij = [xij : qij] and Fj = [xj : zj], where the variables in
sets xij (household level education), qij, and zj are level-1 and level-2 exogenous while in
contrast, the variables in xj are level-1 exogenous but level-2 endogenous. I then use qj
as internal instruments for xj, and the remaining variables serve as their own instruments
As a diagnostic check for level-2 endogeneity, I use the Hausman-type test developed
by Hausman and Taylor (1981). The null of level-2 exogeneity is tested by estimating
xed-e¤ects and random-e¤ects versions of equation (4). Irrespective of whether or not
level-2 endogeneity exists, xed-e¤ects estimation gives unbiased estimates of the within-
coe¢ cients in equation (4) , in contrast, random-e¤ects estimation yields biased estimates
when level-2 endogeneity is present (Ebbes et al., 2004; Castellano et al. 2014).
3.3 Data description and variables used
The data used in the paper are taken from the Third Integrated Household Survey (IHS3)
conducted by Malawis National Statistical O¢ ce (NSO). It is a multi-topic survey which
is statistically designed to be representative at both national, district, urban and rural
levels. It was conducted from March 2010 to March 2011. A stratied two-stage sample
design was used. At the rst stage, enumeration areas, representing communities, as
dened in the 2008 Population Census, stratied by urban/rural status were selected
with probability proportional size. The second stage used systematic random sampling
to select households.
The survey collected information from a sample of 12271 households; 2233 (represent-
ing 18.2%) are urban households, and 10038 (representing 81.8%) are rural households.
A total of 768 communities were selected from 31 districts across the country1. In each
1Malawi has a total of 28 districts. However, the IHS3 treats Lilongwe City, Blantyre City, Mzuzu
City, and Zomba City as separate districts. Likoma district is excluded since it only represents about
0.1% of the population of Malawi, and it was determined that the corresponding cost of enumeration
7
district, a minimum of 24 communities were interviewed while in each community a total
of 16 households were interviewed. In addition to collecting household level data, the
survey collected employment, education, and other socio-economic data on individuals
within the households. It also collected community level information on access to basic
services.
In order to capture possible locational di¤erences, the paper distinguishes between
rural and urban households, and I use the new annualized consumption aggregate for each
household generated by Pauw et al. (2016) instead of the o¢ cial aggregate as a welfare
indicator i.e. the dependent variable. This choice is necessitated by the fact that the food
component in the o¢ cial aggregate is based on conversion factors which have been shown
to have inconsistencies and errors (Verduzco-Gallo and Ecker, 2014). The computation
of quantities of food consumed is based on conversion factors which are used to covert
non-standard units of measurements such as pails, basins, and pieces into standard units
such as kilograms and grams. The new aggregate uses a new set of conversion factors
developed by Verduzco-Gallo and Ecker (2014) to generate the new food component. The
o¢ cial and the new consumption aggregates however have the same non-food component.
In addition to the education variables already discussed, the paper controls for three
groups of independent variables namely; household, community, and xed e¤ects variables.
The choice of variables is guided by previous literature (e.g. Mukherjee and Benson,
2003; Datt and Jollife, 2005, Cruces and Wodon, 2007) on determinants of poverty. At
the household level, I include a set of demographic variables: number of individuals aged
below 9 years, number of individuals aged 10-17 years, number of females aged 18-59 years,
number of males aged 18-59 years, the number of the elderly (above age 60) household
members, the square of household size, linear and quadratic terms in the age of the
household head to capture possible life cycle e¤ects, and a dummy variable for male head
of household.
I also control for employment represented by the number of household members em-
ployed in the primary, secondary, and tertiary industries. In terms of agricultural vari-
ables, I include the number of crops the household cultivated that are not maize or
tobacco, a measure of the diversity of crop cultivation. These include the food crops
cassava, groundnut, rice, millet, sorghum, and beans, and the cash crops cotton. Another
agriculture variable included is the area of cultivated land that is owned by the household.
The agriculture variables are included in the rural regressions only.
At the community level, I include community level health infrastructure and eco-
nomic infrastructure indices to measure availability of and access to basic medical and
economic infrastructure and services in a community. The two indices are constructed
by using multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) (see e.g. Asselin (2002) and Blasius
and Greenacre (2006) for more details). The health infrastructure index is constructed
would be relatively high. The total number of districts or strata covered is therefore 31.
8
from information on the availability in a community of the following: a place to purchase
common medicines, a health clinic, a nurse, midwife or medical assistant, and groups or
programs providing insecticide-treated mosquito bed nets free or at low cost. The eco-
nomic infrastructure index is based on the presence of the following in a community:
a perennial and passable main road, a daily market, a weekly market, a post o¢ ce, a
commercial bank, and a micronance institution.
Two sets of spatial and temporal xed e¤ects variables are included. I include agro-
ecological zone dummies which capture zone level xed e¤ects. There are eight agro-
ecological zones. The agro-ecological zone dummies control for di¤erences in land pro-
ductivity, climate, and market access conditions in an area. Agro-ecological zones are
rural, consequently, they only appear in the rural regression. Being an agro-based econ-
omy, household welfare in Malawi may vary across the year due to possible seasonal e¤ects.
I account for these variations by including three seasonal dummies reecting the harvest,
postharvest, and preplanting periods. I use a Wald test to check for the presence of these
xed e¤ects. Detailed denitions and summary statistics for all the independent variables
are given in Table 3.
4 Results
4.1 Regression Results
Hausman-Taylor tests for the null of level-2 exogeneity of community level average school-
ing return 2 = 99:5 and 2 = 124:0 for the rural and urban models respectively. This
means that in both rural and urban areas, community level average schooling su¤ers from
level-2 endogeneity arising from measurement error. The determinants of poverty results
for rural and urban areas are reported in Table 4. For comparison purposes, three sets of
results for each area are reported; one does not account for education contextual e¤ects
and the other two allow for contextual e¤ects of education. For the two models with
contextual e¤ects, one is based on the standard hierchical linear model (HLM) and the
other addresses level-2 endogeneity by using the Hausman-Taylor (HT) adaptation.
In all the models, theWald test results point to the presence of signicant seasonal and
agroecological e¤ects. Consequently, seasonal and agroecological dummies are included.
The Wald test results further indicate that all the variables included in the models are
jointly statistically signicant. A general pattern in the three sets of results for each
area can be noted: the signs and statistical signicance of all the covariates are generally
similar regardless of whether or not contextual e¤ects are accounted for or whether or
not the problem of level-2 endogeneity is addressed. I now turn to a discussion of the
results for the noncontextual variables before moving on to a more detailed look at the
contextual e¤ect of education on welfare. The interpretation and discussion is based on
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the HT results for each area.
There is a similar pattern regarding the sizes of the coe¢ cients and individual sta-
tistical signicance of the variables that are not entered as contextual variables. Gender
of the household head emerges as a signicant correlate of poverty. Holding other things
constant, female headed households are poorer than male headed households in rural ar-
eas. Precisely, using the HT model, the results show that their per capita consumption is
17.0% lower than that of male headed households. A comparison with a previous study by
Mukherjee and Benson (2003) reveals some di¤erences in the relationship between gender
and poverty in Malawi. Unlike the nding in this paper, they found a rather puzzling
result that in rural areas of Malawi, male headed households are poorer. A negative sign
on the gender dummy in urban areas suggests that this gender di¤erence is in favour of
female headed households. This rather counterintuitive nding in urban areas is however
consistent with what Mukherjee and Benson (2003) also found.
The age of the household head has a signicant inverted u-shaped relationship with
standard of living in both areas. Precisely, using results which account for contextual
factors, I nd that household living standards increase with the age of the head up to 65
years (90th percentile) in rural areas, and 74 years (99th percentile) in urban areas, and
diminish thereafter. This means that there are signicant life cycle e¤ects which reect
increased earning capacity arising from greater experience and smoothing of consumption
over ones lifetime. This common nding (e.g. Grootaert,1997; Datt and Jollife, 2005)
is however in stark contrast to a previous study by Mukherjee and Benson (2003) who
found a negative relationship between age and welfare in Malawi.
In terms of household composition, the results indicate that in the rural model, the
coe¢ cients are more negative for children aged 0-9 and the elderly (aged 60 above) than
for the economically active category (i.e. 18-59 age category). This means that an increase
in dependent household members leads to a larger welfare reduction than an increase in
those in the economically active group. For the urban model, only the coe¢ cient for
children aged 0-9 is more negative than for the economically active group while that for
the elderly is less negative Moreover, in both areas, an increase in the household of
female adults in the economically active group does not a¤ect per capita consumption.
In contrast, the e¤ect on welfare following the addition in a household of a male adult
in the economically active group is statistically signicant in both areas, but, it is larger
in rural areas ( 30.9%) than in urban areas (about 23.1%). Considering that economic
opportunities tend to favour men, one would expect a reverse pattern.
The coe¢ cient on the square of household size is positive and statistically signicant,
and this together with the nding that the household composition variables are negatively
and signicantly related to welfare suggests that there is a U-shaped relationship between
household size and living standards. This is a common empirical nding (see e.g., Lanjouw
and Ravallion, 1995; Lipton and Ravallion, 1995; Mukherjee and Benson, 2003; Datt and
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Jollife, 2005). The use of per capita consumption implicitly assumes away the importance
of economies of scale of household size in consumption i.e. it costs less to house two people
than to house two individuals separately. and the role of household composition i.e. food
needs depend on age and gender. Some studies have shown that the impact of household
size on poverty disappears once these two problems are addressed (e.g. Lanjouw and
Ravallion, 1995; White and Masset, 2003).
To make certain that the e¤ect of household size on consumption in Malawi is not
driven by the per capita normalization, I re-estimated the poverty models by adjusting
consumption for composition and economies of scale2. In both rural and urban models,
the results show that the coe¢ cients on the di¤erent age-sex composition variables are
negative and signicant, but critically, the coe¢ cients are smaller in size compared to
those from the per capita normalisation. For instance, in the rural model, the coe¢ cient
on children below 9 is -0.038 when the economies of scale parameter is 0.4, and then the
coe¢ cient rises to -0.239 for an economies of scale parameter of 1. Similarly, for urban
areas, the coe¢ cient on children below 9 is -0.029 when the economies of scale parameter
is put at 0.4, it then rises to -0.226 when the parameter is 1. This means that the negative
relationship between household size and welfare is not necessarily driven by the per capita
normalisation but that larger households are indeed poorer than smaller ones. Besides,
using the per capita measure merely leads to an overestimation of the impact of household
size on poverty.
Employment as measured by the number of adults in a household employed in the
primary, secondary, and tertiary economic sectors exhibit a mixed pattern. There are no
statistically signicant welfare advantages to nding employment in the primary (agricul-
ture, shing, mining, etc.) and secondary (manufacturing) sectors. However, regardless of
location, employment in the tertiary sector (sales and service industries) has a statistically
signicant, and positive e¤ect on welfare. Holding all else constant, having an additional
household member employed in a tertiary industry occupation increases consumption by
19.9% in rural areas and by 12.6% in urban areas. Notably, Mukherjee and Benson (2003)
found a rather counterintuitive result that employment in a tertiary occupation does not
inuence welfare in urban areas in Malawi.
In terms of agriculture, the results indicate that land ownership and crop diversi-
cation have statistically signicant e¤ects on poverty. Holding other factors constant,
an increase in cultivated area per capita by an acre increases per capita consumption in
rural Malawi by 8.0%. Crop diversication beyond maize and tobacco leads to a rather
modest ceteris paribus increase in living standards of 3.9%. Both health and economic
infrastructure in the community have a positive e¤ect on household welfare. Furthermore,
2Instead of normalising by household size, I normalise consumption byA =(E) ; where E a nutrition-
based age and sex-specic adult equivalents by the WHO (1985), and 1   is a measure of economies of
scale. I experimented with the following values of economies of scale 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, and 1.0.
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in rural areas, improvements in economic infrastructure such as a perennial and passable
main road, a daily market, a weekly market have a larger e¤ect on welfare than health
infrastructure such as clinics and nurses. However, a reverse pattern is observed in urban
areas.
I now turn to a key focus of this paper, and discuss results on the existence, nature and
form of contextual e¤ects emanating from community level education. In discussing these
results, I look at both the within and contextual e¤ects of education. As noted already,
the within e¤ects represent internal returns to education while the contextual e¤ects
capture externalities of community level education i.e. external returns to education.
The Wald test results in Table 4 conrm that jointly there are signicant contextual
e¤ects of education.
As would be expected in the presence of measurement error, the coe¢ cients on within
and between community schooling are attenuated as one moves from the standard HLM
results to the HT results. All the within-household education variables have statistically
signicant positive e¤ects on per capita consumption; implying that the level of educa-
tion in a household reduces the likelihood of poverty in Malawi. Moreover, the internal
returns to education are quantitatively sizable. The returns to education are however are
gender-di¤erentiated. For instance, in rural areas and holding other factors constant, an
additional year of schooling for females in a household leads to a 4.2% increase in per
capita consumption while for males the corresponding e¤ect is 3.0%.
Irrespective of gender, the results further indicate that there are spatial di¤erences
in the size of the intrahousehold returns to education with urban areas exhibiting quan-
titatively larger returns than rural areas. For example, the marginal e¤ect of the years of
education for females in a household is 4.2% in rural areas while it jumps to 5.0% in urban
areas. This rural-urban di¤erence in the role of education perhaps reects the paucity of
remunerative economic opportunities in rural areas of Malawi (Mukherjee and Benson,
2003).
The nding that household level education reduces poverty is common in the poverty
literature (see e.g. Mukherjee and Benson, 2003; Datt and Jollife, 2005, Cruces and
Wodon, 2007), and is therefore not surprising. The question is, does education beyond
the household have any impact on a households welfare? Are there positive externalities
of community level education? The results do show that regardless of gender there is a
signicant positive e¤ect of community level education on household welfare in rural and
urban areas which is over and above that arising from education within the household.
In rural areas, the marginal return of average years of schooling of female and male
community members are 7.2% and 6.1% respectively. For the urban sample, the external
returns to community education are 9.9% and 7.9% for females and males respectively.
Just like the impact of within-household education, the size of the contextual e¤ect of
education is also gender-dependent; the contextual e¤ect is larger in magnitude for female
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education than male education in both rural and urban areas. The external returns to
community education are also di¤erent spatially, here the results show that the returns are
more pronounced in urban areas than in rural areas for both male and female education.
A comparison of the two sets of returns to education shows that the size of this
community education externality is larger than that of the intrahousehold return to ed-
ucation. For instance, the rural results indicate that the marginal return of female years
of schooling in a household is 4.2% while the corresponding impact of schooling at the
community level is 7.2%. For the urban sample, the model results indicate that holding
all else constant, an increase in the average years of schooling of females in a community
is associated with a 9.9% increase in per capita consumption while the partial return of
within-household education is smaller at 5.0%. This is important as it suggests that edu-
cation has both private and public good properties, and that there are signicant welfare
benets that accrue to households that reside in a community where some members are
educated. Moreover, these external benets of education are larger than internal benets
of education.
I delve deeper into the pattern of this benet by examining whether households with
little or no education benet more from living in communities where some inhabitants
are educated. Apriori one would expect the inter-household education externality to be
relatively more pronounced for those households with little or no schooling than for those
with high levels of schooling. Mussa (2015) for example nds that in the context of
maize production in Malawi, farmers who reside in households where members are not
educated have relatively higher production, and lower production uncertainty if they live
in communities where some inhabitants are educated.
I empirically answer this question by looking at how the positive education externality
varies across the rst (bottom 10%) decile and the last (top 10%) decile of female and
male average years of schooling in a household. This is done by re-estimating the poverty
regressions for each one of the two deciles. Households in the rst decile of schooling are
the least educated while those in the last decile are the most educated on average. The
results are presented in Table 5. The results provide some useful insight into the nature,
form, and pattern of education externalities on household welfare.
Across the deciles, the sizes coe¢ cients on average years of schooling of females and
males in a community are generally consistent with expectations. In both rural and urban
areas, least educated households enjoy signicantly larger benets from increases in female
and male years of schooling at the community level than the most educated households.
The rural results for instance indicate that the marginal returns of an additional year
of female and male schooling in a community are respectively 5.5% and 3.3% for the
households in the bottom 10%. However, the corresponding externalities of community
schooling for the top 10% are statistically not di¤erent from zero. Similar to the rural
results, the urban results show that the externality of female education for the least
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educated households is statistically signicant and larger than that for the most educated
households. In contrast to the rural results, the externality for households in the top 10%
in urban areas is statistically di¤erent from zero.
Notably, the sizes of these signicant externalities for the bottom and top 10% are
larger for females than for males. This is consistent with the overall nding earlier of
gender-di¤erentiated community externalities of education. The nding that the least ed-
ucated households enjoy signicantly more from spillovers of community education cou-
pled with the fact that poorest households tend to have the lowest level of education
means that the positive education spillovers on household welfare are equality-inducing.
Additionally, this equalising e¤ect of community education is stronger for female educa-
tion.
It is important to put these results in some context. The results can be placed in
the broader literature on returns to education. In general, the literature on returns to
education in the labour market nds about an 8-10% return to an extra year of education
(Psacharopoulos, 1994; Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2002). In this paper, I nd that the
internal returns to education are in the range 3-5% while external returns to education
vary from 6.1% to 9.9%.
In Table 6 I show how average per capita expenditure in US$ changes following a
partial one year increase in female and male education within a household and at the
community level. The associated changes in per capita expenditure are quantitatively
substantial.. For example, for rural areas, an extra year of female education within a
household is on average worth about US$14.13 in additional expenditure. In contrast, a
one-year increase in community level education of females is on average associated with
an extra expenditure of US$24.22.
4.2 Robustness Checks
Is the evidence of the existence of externalities of education sensitive to the way schooling
is captured? The above results are based on the average years of schooling in a household
and a community. It can be argued that the externality of schooling can best be captured
by the highest level of education among all household or all community members. Take
the case of crop production decisions such as application of fertiliser, the one who receives
the highest education in the household or at the community can help other household and
community members in making these decisions. I therefore re-estimated the above models,
and replaced household average years of schooling with the maximum years of schooling in
a household, and average years of schooling in a community with the maximum of years of
schooling in a community. The results are reported in Table 7, and they show statistically
signicant and sizable community level externalities of education found earlier.
Specically, the nding that the externalities of community level education are larger
14
than the internal return to education remains unchanged even when this new denition
is adopted, and the internal and external returns of education are larger for females than
for males. Furthermore, returns to education are larger in magnitude in rural areas than
in urban areas. are All this implies that the nding that there are positive education
spillovers of community schooling is not sensitive to how schooling is measured. The
rest of the analysis is therefore based on average years of schooling at the household and
community levels.
Another concern that can be put forward is that aggregating schooling at the com-
munity level may not be appropriate given the fact that the survey was not designed to
be representative at the community level i.e. the survey was designed to be representative
at the district level. I re-estimated the HT model with average years of schooling of males
and females at the district level. The results are displayed in Table 8. Here again I nd
signicant externalities of education on household welfare. Moreover, the pattern and na-
ture of the education externalities is the same as that observed earlier when aggregation
was at the community level. Thus, the existence of education externalities on poverty is
not driven by the level of aggregation.
5 Concluding Remarks
The paper has used Malawian data from the Third Integrated Household Survey to in-
vestigate the presence and pattern of contextual e¤ects of community level education on
household poverty. These contextual e¤ects reect the presence of education externalities
at the community level. I have used an adaptation of the Hausman-Taylor estimator for
hierchical models which controls for level-2 endogeneity of community schooling. The
results show that regardless of gender, there is a signicant positive e¤ect of community
level education on household welfare in rural and urban areas which is over and above
that arising from education within the household. These externalities of community level
education are larger for females than males.
The paper has found that the return to within household education is smaller in
magnitude than the community level externality of education. These ndings are robust
to alternative denitions of schooling and level of aggregation. The paper has also found
that in both rural and urban areas, least educated households enjoy signicantly larger
benets from increases in female and male years of schooling at the community level
than the most educated households. This means that community level schooling not only
spillovers to the rest of the community membership in terms of improved living standards,
but also the positive education spillovers on household welfare are equality-inducing.
Signicantly, the ndings here imply that least educated households are not neces-
sarily worse-o¤ in terms of welfare as they may benet from living in communities where
some members are educated. These social benets emanating from educating individual
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members of a society further strengthen the view that when evaluating the costs and
benets of education investments social returns should be included as a failure to do so
may underestimate the benets of education and lead to its under-provision.
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Table 1: Trends and levels of economic growth, poverty, and inequality
Indicator/Area 2005 2011
GDP growth 6.2a 6.1b
Poverty headcount
National 52.4 50.7
Rural 55.9 56.6
Urban 25.4 17.3
Gini Coefficient
National 0.390 0.452
Rural 0.339 0.375
Urban 0.484 0.491
a Average GDP growth for 2004-2007, b average GDP growth for 2008-2014.
Source: NSO (2005, 2012a, 2012b), RBM Annual Economic Report (various issues)
Table 2: Trends and levels using some education statistics, 2004-2011
Indicator Malawi Rural Urban
2004 2011 2004 2011 2004 2011
Adult literacy 63.9 65.4 60.9 60.7 85.6 89.0
Net primary enrolment rate 80.0 85.8 79.3 84.6 86.8 92.7
Gross primary enrolment rate 112.9 120.0 112.0 119.2 122.4 125.1
Primary dropout rate 5.1 1.3 5.3 1.4 4.1 0.9
Average years of schooling 4.09 4.96 3.63 4.37 7.59 8.01
Source: NSO (2005, 2012a)
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Table 5: Contextual e¤ects (CE) across the rst decile and the last decile
Variable Rural Urban
Bottom 10% Top 10% Bottom 10% Top 10%
Comm. average of schooling of  females 0.055*** -0.011 0.070* 0.063*
(0.020) (0.030) (0.038) (0.033)
[2010] [438] [329] [1144]
Comm. average of schooling of  males 0.033* 0.026 0.050** 0.045*
(0.018) (0.025) (0.022) (0.026)
[1759] [609] [275] [544]
Notes: Deciles are for the corresponding household level variable. In square brackets are observations in each
decile of a variable. Standard errors in parentheses, *** indicates significant at 1%; ** at 5%; and, * at 10%.
Table 6: Changes in average per capita expenditure following an additional year of school-
ing
Mean Female Male
Within Household Community Within Household Community
Rural 336.40 14.13 24.22 10.09 20.52
Urban 846.87 42.34 83.84 38.96 66.90
Notes: Over the survey period the exchange rate was Malawi Kwacha (MK) 150.80=1US$. The mean expenditures
are population weighted.
Table 7: Contextual e¤ects (CE) of maximum years of schooling in a community
Variable Rural Urban
HT CE SE HT CE SE
HH max. years of schooling of females 0.037*** (0.002) 0.041*** (0.005)
HH max. years of schooling of males 0.029*** (0.002) 0.035*** (0.005)
Comm. max. of schooling of  females 0.038** (0.015) 0.072*** (0.009)
Comm. max.  schooling of males 0.037** (0.017) 0.057*** (0.016)
Notes: CE denotes contextual effects. HT is Hausman-Taylor adaptation of the hierchical linear model. Control variables
(not shown) are the same as those in Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significant at 1%; ** at 5%;
and, * at 10%.
Table 8: Contextual e¤ects (CE) of average years of schooling in a district
Variable Rural Urban
HT CE SE HT CE SE
HH average years of schooling of females 0.038*** (0.002) 0.046*** (0.004)
HH average years of schooling of males 0.026*** (0.002) 0.041*** (0.004)
District average of schooling of  females 0.042*** (0.001) 0.068* (0.002)
District average of schooling of males 0.030*** (0.006) 0.070*** (0.007)
Notes: CE denotes contextual effects. HT is Hausman-Taylor adaptation of the hierchical linear model. Control variables
(not shown) are the same as those in Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significant at 1%; ** at 5%;
and, * at 10%.
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